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CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: AsPECTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS. By 
Leonard W. Levy. New York: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. 
viii, 272. $32.00. 
Throughout Leonard Levy's career the prime focus of his scholar-
ship has been on the origin and development of important constitu-
tional provisions. 1 Constitutional Opinions is a collection of twelve 
independent essays drawn predominantly from Levy's previous 
works.2 The book is a survey of Levy's own constitutional interests 
and scholarship. The themes Levy touches on include freedom of 
speech, religious toleration and religious establishment, and the right 
against self-incrimination. The historical time periods he addresses 
begin in seventeenth century England, move to the period during and 
1. Leonard W. Levy is the Andrew W. Mellon All Claremont Professor of Humanities and 
Chairman of the Graduate Faculty of History at the Claremont Graduate School. His 1968 
book, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION won 
the Pulitzer Prize for History. His numerous other writings include: EMERGENCE OF A FREE 
PRESS (1985); TREASON AGAINST Goo: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY (1981); 
AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974); and JEFFERSON AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE. (1963). 
2. Only one of the essays is new, the other eleven are revised or exact reprints from earlier 
books and articles published by Levy. The author identifies the original sources of the reprinted 
or revised works in his acknowledgements. 
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immediately following the passage of the United States Constitution 
and Bill of Rights, and finally turn to the Supreme Court during the 
Warren and early Burger years. Levy does not dwell on the institu-
tional and economic forces of history as do many modern historians. 
He instead explores the often complex personal motivations and opin-
ions of historical figures such as John Lilburne, James Nayler, John 
Peter Zenger, and Thomas Jefferson.3 
One of the book's most interesting essays, entitled "The Original 
Meaning of the Establishment Clause," analyzes the intended meaning 
of the first amendment's establishment of religion clause, at the time of 
its passage.4 The Supreme Court has adopted a broad interpretation 
of this clause, holding that the first amendment prohibits not only gov-
ernment preference of one religion over another, but also impartial 
government support to all religions. 5 Many scholars support an equal 
protection interpretation, asserting that the clause was originally in-
tended only to prevent government preference of one religion over an-
other. 6 Levy acknowledges that historical evidence falls short of the 
crystal clarity that advocates of both positions claim, but concludes 
that "[a] preponderance of the evidence ... indicates that the Supreme 
Court's interpretation is historically the more accurate one" (p. 136). 
Having revealed to the reader his conclusions, Levy proceeds to pre-
sent the existing historical evidence for both positions together with 
his interpretations of the evidence. While Levy would like to convince 
the reader of the correctness of his position, it is worth noting that he 
puts forth all the evidence for the reader to draw his own conclusions. 
The following paragraphs will review the analysis and evidence Levy 
presents in his essay. 
Levy's review of establishment clause history begins with the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 and the state ratification controversies 
that followed. Those who attended the Convention intentionally 
3. The titles of the individual essays are good indicators of their content: Freedom of Speech 
in Seventeenth-Century Thought; John Lilburne and the Rights of Englishmen; Quaker Blas-
phemy and Toleration; Did the Zenger Case Really Matter? Freedom of the Press in Colonial New 
York; Constitutional History, 1776-1789; The Bill of Rights; The Original Meaning of the Estab-
lishment Cause; Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800; Jefferson As a Civil Libertarian; 
History and Judicial History: The Case of the Fifth Amendment; Subversion of Miranda; and 
Judicial Activism and Strict Construction. 
4. Pp. 135-61. Levy does not deal with the conflicts and interaction of the establishment and 
free exercise clauses of the first amendment. This question, as much as the original intent debate, 
has engaged the attention of the United States Supreme Court and legal scholars. See, e.g., 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: 
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT L. REV. 673 (1980). 
5. See, for example, Justice Black's influential dictum in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 15-16 (1947); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
6. E.g., R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT 
FICTION (1982); M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM 
FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
RELIGION CLAUSES (1964). 
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chose not to include a bill of rights. They believed the negative impli-
cations of the enumerated powers and the structure of the federal gov-
ernment itself would be sufficient to safeguard the liberties a bill of 
rights was intended to protect. 7 Opponents of a strong federal govern-
ment used the lack of a bill of rights to agitate against passage of the 
Constitution during the ratification process. In response, many state 
conventions included recommendations for a bill of rights in their res-
olutions approving the Constitution (pp. 139-42). The Virginia Con-
vention, for example, recommended an amendment stating "that no 
Religious Sect or Society ought to be favored or established, by Law, 
in preference of others" (p. 141; citation omitted). Levy sees recom-
mendations for amendments by the state constitutional conventions as 
attempts to mollify critics and allay public fears, rather than as at-
tempts to put forth serious proposals for amendments. 8 For this rea-
son Levy chooses to rely more heavily on other evidence to determine 
what was intended by the establishment clause. 
Scholars on both sides of the establishment clause debate cite the 
congressional debates on the establishment clause in support of their 
position. Madison's original draft proposal to Congress read: "The 
civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or 
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the 
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pre-
text, infringed" (p. 144; citation omitted). Proponents of an equal pro-
tection interpretation view the use of the adjective "national" as strong 
support for their position (p. 144). 
Levy agrees the words on their face might lend themselves to such 
an interpretation, but believes it would require drastic and unex-
plained shifts of opinion on Madison's part. In 1785, four years ear-
lier, Madison helped lead the opposition to a Virginia tax for the 
support of Christian religions generally. Madison repeatedly referred 
to the proposal as an "establishment of religion" in his famous Memo-
rial and Remonstrance (p. 144). Shortly after the Bill of Rights passed 
Congress, Madison opposed a bill to set aside land for the nonprefer-
ential support of religion in the western territories. Madison vehe-
7. Pp. 105-06, 136-37. This is not to say members of the Constitutional Convention always 
opposed government interference with matters that ultimately were protected by the Bill of 
Rights. In the case of religious establishment Levy asserts, "[m]any contemporaries, especially in 
New England, believed that governments could and should foster religion, or at least Protestant 
Christianity. All agreed, however, that the matter pertained to the realm of state government 
and that the federal government possessed no authority to meddle in religious matters." P. 142. 
8. Levy concludes: 
They do not even necessarily indicate that preference of one sect over others was all that was 
comprehended by an establishment of religion. They do indicate that preference of one sect 
over others was something so feared that to assuage that fear by specifically making it 
groundless became a political necessity. 
P. 142. 
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mently opposed the measure, describing it as unjust and outside the 
authority of Congress (p. 144). 
The House debates were not recorded verbatim. Levy finds the 
summary of these debates to be of little value in determining the origi-
nal meaning of the establishment clause. He concludes: "That the 
House understood the debate, cared deeply about its outcome, or 
shared a common understanding of the finished amendment is doubt-
ful" (p. 147). This conclusion stems both from statements made in the 
course of the debate and from Levy's broader thesis that the Federal-
ists felt the Bill of Rights unnecessary, supporting it only to devalue 
the political capital of those opposed to the new federal system.9 The 
final proposal submitted to the Senate read: "Congress shall make no 
law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor 
shall the rights of conscience be infringed" (p. 148). 
The Senate passed a proposal reading, "Congress shall make no 
law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting 
the free exercise of religion" (p. 148). The language appears to have a 
narrow scope, but the Senate before passing this version rejected ver-
sions which clearly stated the clause prohibited only the preference of 
one religion over another (p. 148). 
While the House readily accepted many of the Senate proposals, it 
rejected the Senate religion amendment. The House stuck to this posi-
tion in the Conference Committee that followed. Eventually the 
Chairman of the Senate conferees reported to the Senate that the 
House would accept the Senate version of all other amendments if the 
Senate would accept a version of the establishment clause giving it the 
present phraseology. In Levy's opinion, the House position can be ex-
plained only if the House intended to prohibit more than mere prefer-
ential treatment of one religion over all others (pp. 148-49). This deal 
was accepted by both houses and the amendments were sent to the 
states for ratification (pp. 148-49). 
While there are few records of the ratification debates of most 
states, abundant materials remain from Virginia's deliberations. Eight 
anti-Federalist state senators attacked the establishment clause of the 
Bill of Rights as inadequate to prevent even discriminatory federal 
funding and support of religion. The only effect, according to the Sen-
ators, was to prevent the formal designation of a proscribed national 
religion (p. 150). To many scholars the opposition of these eight Sena-
tors is the strongest evidence supporting the narrower, equal protec-
tion interpretation (p. 150). 
Levy disagrees with this interpretation, believing the opposition's 
interpretation a political maneuver designed to swing public support 
against the Bill of Rights. The opposition's real agenda was to force a 
9. P. 147. For a more robust development of Levy's thesis that the Federalists did not be-
lieve the Bill of Rights to be important, see Chapter Six, The Bill of Rights, pp. 105-34. 
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new Bill of Rights that would include greater limits on Congress's 
commerce and tax powers (pp. 150-51). Madison, who led the ratifica-
tion fight in Virginia, wrote to President Washington that the opposi-
tion's interpretation was clearly contrary to the intended and 
commonly understood meaning. Additionally, the eight opposition 
senators had in the past consistently supported state taxes to support 
religion. Those supporting passage had been the champions of rigid 
church-state separation (p. 151). Levy concludes that Virginia's pas-
sage of the amendments over the objection of the opposition is best 
read as a rejection of a narrow reading of the establishment1clause (p. 
152). 
In the final sections of the essay, Levy reviews state constitutional 
and statutory provisions relating to support for religion in an attempt 
to understand the colonial American definition of "establishment of 
religion." Levy believes many scholars have incorrectly looked to the 
European meaning of establishment in an attempt to understand its 
usage in the United States. The American tradition, Levy believes, 
diverges from that of Europe, where establishment meant that a single 
church enjoyed monopolistic privileges and a legal stamp of approval 
by the government (p. 152). He concludes that "[a]n establishment of 
religion in America at the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights 
meant government aid and sponsorship of religion, principally by im-
partial tax support of the institutions of religion, the churches" (p. 
161; emphasis omitted). 
At the time of the passage of the Bill of Rights, six states had con-
stitutional provisions or statutes which allowed state support of reli-
gion (p. 161). The religions these provisions supported were not 
limited to one church but meant state support for "[m]any different 
churches, or the religion held in common by all of them, i.e., Christi-
anity or Protestantism."10 These state establishment provisions were 
in essence establishing a nonpreferential, nondiscriminatory support 
system for a large number, or in some cases all, of the religions present 
in the state. 
10. P. 161. The experience in New York is illustrative. When the English gained control of 
New York in 1664, the Dutch Reform Church was disestablished as the official religion. In its 
place a system developed whereby every township was obligated to support a Protestant church 
and minister of the town's choice. Many different Protestant religions benefited. P. 153. In 1688 
the English government instructed its governor of New York officially to establish Anglicanism 
as the commonwealth's religion, but the bill that eventually passed in the legislature provided 
only for the support of "a good and sufficient Protestant Minister." Pp. 153-54; citations omit-
ted. For the next fifty years Anglicans and non-Anglicans argued over whether the bill estab-
lished only the Anglicans or established all Protestant religions. The confrontation was 
particularly reflected in the organization of King's College (later Columbia University). Angli-
cans asserted that they, as the established religion of the Colony, should be given exclusive con-
trol of the school. The opposition insisted that the establishment was of no particular church but 
of the Protestant denomination generally. P. 154. Levy concludes, "the concept of a multiple 
establishment of religion was not only understood by but also engaged the attention of the in-
habitants of colonial New York." Pp. 154-55. 
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Virginia debated whether to provide for state support of religion 
officially just four years before the passage of the Bill of Rights. The 
1785 confrontations in Virginia over whether the state should pass a 
bill giving nonpreferential support to all "Christian religions" provides 
much evidence as to Madison's feelings about even nonpreferential 
support. In notes for his speech against the measure Madison argued 
religion was a matter of private, not public concern. He described the 
nonpreferential system he opposed as an establishment of religion. 
"The true question, [Madison] declared, was not 'Is religion neces-
sary?', but rather 'Are religious establishments necessary for religion?', 
to which he argued in the negative" (p. 160; citation omitted). The bill 
was eventually defeated and the legislature passed instead Thomas 
Jefferson's "Bill for Religious Freedom" (pp. 160-61). That bill pro-
vided in part "that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever" (p. 160; citation 
omitted). 
Levy's final conclusions about the meaning of the establishment 
clause are that: 
No member of the First Congress came from a state that supported an 
exclusive establishment of religion; no such example could have been 
found in the America of 1789. Of those states that provided public sup-
port for religion, half of them had provided for such at least theoretically 
since the early eighteenth century; the remainder did so from the time of 
the American Revolution. Their experience told the legislators in 1789 
that an establishment of religion meant not state preference for one reli-
gion but non-preferential support for many. [p. 161] 
Levy's historical essays are for the most part thoughtful, well rea-
soned, and well researched. Surprisingly, five of the essays contain no 
footnote references, a weakness for those wishing to do further reading 
on the subject of those essays. 11 In two essays Levy departs from his-
torical analysis and enters the judicial activism debate. 12 These essays 
are not as powerful as Levy's historical pieces. Levy does not take the 
space to develop fully the public policy arguments he is making and 
fails to acknowledge the existence of opposing arguments. What is left 
often comes across as a series of shrill, personal attacks on the Burger 
11. Those essays are Freedom of Speech in Seventeenth-Century Thought, Constitutional His-
tory, 1776-1789, The Bill of Rights. Jefferson As a Civil Libertarian, and History and Judicial 
History: The Case of the Fifth Amendment. Other essays contain extensive footnoting. 
12. In Subversion of Miranda, Levy attempts to show why he believes the opinion of the 
Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), was "one of the most scandalous, extraordi-
nary, and inexplicable in the history of the Court." P. 210. In Harris, the Court allowed the use 
of an illegally obtained statement of a criminal defendant against the defendant for the purpose of 
impeaching the defendant's testimony. In Judicial Activism and Strict Construction, Levy de-
fends the Warren Court's "judicial activism" against charges of criminal-coddling and subverting 
the role of legislatures, which were made by supporters of the Burger Court and "strict 
construction." 
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Court and the Court decisions Levy disagrees with. 13 
Overall, the book is written with clarity and enough background 
information to be accessible even to those unfamiliar with the legal 
history involved. The rich detail and analysis make most of the essays 
interesting to those familiar with the topics as well. The book is worth 
recommending to anyone with an interest in the historical background 
of many of today's most important and controversial constitutional 
provisions. 
- Kenneth F. Sparks 
13. An example from Subversion of Miranda will serve to illustrate this point. In describing 
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Harris, 401 U.S. 222, 
[n]ever to be forgotten is that Harris plainly denied the truth, that the defendant did claim 
his statement was involuntary, and that the Court did permit the use of a statement which it 
conceded had been illegally obtained. The Court's elephantine misrepresentations and man-
gling of precedents could not have been deliberately calculated. Incompetence may have 
some claim to an explanation of Harris. But the truth about it, which cannot be known, 
probably derives from the same sort of zeal that drives the police to become lawless in the 
act of apprehending and interrogating suspects. 
P. 220. This is not to say that Levy is wrong in his conclusions or that he is intentionally mali-
cious. It is only to point out that Levy does not appear to add any new ideas to a debate that has 
raged for years. 
